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Learning by Driving: Productivity Improvements  
by New York City Taxi Drivers†
By Kareem Haggag, Brian McManus, and Giovanni Paci*
We study learning by doing by New York City taxi drivers, who 
have substantial discretion over their driving strategies and receive 
compensation closely tied to their success in finding customers. In 
addition to documenting learning overall by these entrepreneurial 
agents, we exploit our data’s breadth to investigate the factors that 
contribute to driver improvement across a variety of situations. 
New drivers lag further behind experienced drivers when in difficult 
situations. Drivers benefit from accumulating  neighborhood-specific 
experience, which affects how they search for their next customers. 
(JEL D83, J24, L26, L92, R41)
Learning by Doing (LBD) is an economically important phenomenon which can affect several types of market activity. At the level of the individual worker, 
learning is a source of productivity improvements that can increase wages. At the 
firm level, LBD can be  welfare-improving when it leads to cost reductions that 
increase output in competitive markets; less beneficial effects can exist in concen-
trated markets, where LBD may provide incumbents with cost advantages that deter 
entry. While there exists an extensive literature that documents learning effects in 
many settings (see Thompson 2010 and 2012, for surveys), in prior studies it has 
been difficult to learn which agents in a firm are improving their capabilities, what 
activities are being improved, and how strongly individual agents are encouraged to 
find improvements.
We provide new evidence on LBD that addresses some of these gaps in the liter-
ature. We use a highly detailed dataset of New York City (NYC) yellow taxi rides to 
study how drivers make improvements overall, how their performance varies across 
measurably different situations, and how general and specific experience make dif-
ferent contributions to driver performance and strategies. Taxi service in NYC is 
characterized by several features that make it an interesting setting for studying 
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LBD.1 First, drivers have substantial discretion in how they search for new cus-
tomers, and their pay is closely tied to the earnings they collect through customers’ 
fares. Drivers’ agency makes them similar to entrepreneurs, searching for the next 
fruitful business opportunity. Second, drivers operate in an environment that lends 
itself to a relatively clean study of learning. While other LBD studies often con-
tend with isolating productivity improvements from confounding factors, such as 
scale economies, improvements in inputs, and shifts in input prices, by contrast all 
taxi drivers use essentially the same capital equipment, work in the same demand 
and cost environment, and charge the same prices. Third, we observe drivers vis-
iting a variety of locations a large number of times, which provides opportunities 
to observe driver performance in different settings. The customer’s control over 
 drop-off locations introduces econometrically useful variation in whether a driver 
arrives in a setting with strong or weak demand, or within which the driver has little 
or substantial prior experience.
We perform our analysis using data on all 171 million NYC yellow taxi rides 
during the full 2009 calendar year. Our main analysis features a sample of about 
6,300 drivers, with almost 1,800 identified as new based on the date of the driver’s 
first appearance in the 2009 data. Our main measure of a new driver’s stock of 
experience is his cumulative number of shifts as of a particular day, although it is 
also possible to use finer units such as the driver’s cumulative number of  drop-offs. 
We measure driver output through fare earnings per hour, and in our main analysis 
we regress new drivers’ earnings on measures of their experience. The breadth of 
our data allows us to control for variation in earning opportunities across individual 
hours of the sample period, as well as to focus on  within-driver learning to avoid 
attrition problems. In addition to overall measures of learning and performance, 
we use information on the time and location of every 2009 taxi ride to investigate 
two additional issues. First, we use experienced drivers’ performance across differ-
ent New York City neighborhoods and different times of the week to characterize 
whether certain situations represent “easy” or “hard” earnings opportunities. We 
then analyze how new drivers’ performance varies across these settings. Second, we 
compute each new driver’s stock of experience in each neighborhood as of each date 
in our sample period; we use these data to examine how drivers’  location-specific 
performance is affected by local experience versus overall tenure in the market.
We find that an average new driver’s overall productivity increases by 7 percent 
between his first and one hundredth shift, which is worth about $344 in cumula-
tive fare earnings. Learning is relatively fast, and the overall improvement is fairly 
small, representing roughly 1.4 percent of gross fare revenue (or about 2.5 percent 
of  take-home pay) during the first 100 shifts. We demonstrate that our results are 
affected substantially by the econometric controls we are able to apply, and in the 
controls’ absence we obtain learning effects that are three times as large.
1 Several other authors have studied other aspects of the NYC taxi market. Studies of drivers’ labor supply 
choices have produced results on the role of  reference-dependent preferences (Camerer et al. 1997; Crawford and 
Meng 2011; Doran 2014; Farber 2005, 2008, 2015). Other industry features that have been studied include moral 
hazard in leasing contracts (Schneider 2010; Jackson and Schneider 2011) and tipping by customers (Haggag and 
Paci 2014). 
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In addition to estimating the value of learning overall, we describe substantial 
heterogeneity in learning rates across locations and types of driver experience. We 
find that new drivers earn considerably less in more difficult situations. Following a 
 drop-off in one of the most difficult locations, a driver in his first shift earns 14 per-
cent less than an experienced driver in the same situation, but brand new drivers 
have essentially the same expected earnings as experienced drivers in the easiest 
settings. Despite the large gap in initial earnings in difficult situations, new drivers’ 
earnings improve fastest there and quickly erase the gap with experienced drivers. 
Turning to drivers’ experience in specific neighborhoods, we find that a driver’s 
amount of local experience has a strong effect on performance after a  drop-off in 
that neighborhood. Accumulated  drop-offs in other neighborhoods, which  stand-in 
for general experience, have a less robust effect. Local experience also has a signif-
icant role in explaining where new drivers find their next customers. Drivers with a 
greater share of experience in a  drop-off neighborhood are more likely to stay there 
to find their next fares.
Our results join a large empirical literature on LBD. As we do, Pisano, Bohmer, 
and Edmondson (2001), Rockart and Dutt (2015), and Stith (2013) each consider 
learning outside of a factory setting. Other research has considered heterogeneity 
across diverse production settings and offer some controls for this diversity; exam-
ples include Thompson (2001), Balasubramanian and Liebman (2010), and Kellogg 
(2011). An additional branch of the literature analyzes highly detailed data in order 
to consider a variety of explanations for how improvements occur and how learning 
is transmitted through the firm; see Hatch and Mowery (1998); Levitt, List, and 
Syverson (2013); and Hendel and Spiegel (2014). While the LBD literature largely 
focuses on output or cost improvements, Levitt, List, and Syverson (2013) and Mas 
(2008) consider evidence of quality improvements due to learning. Finally, there 
exists a literature on learning by entrepreneurs (e.g., Rocha, Carniero, and Varum 
2013; Lafontaine and Shaw 2014), but this research focuses on learning across 
entrepreneurial episodes rather than learning about demand within a single business 
venture.
Our paper also relates to the labor economics literature that studies the returns 
from worker experience (e.g., Shaw and Lazear 2008), and additionally the rel-
ative benefits of general versus firm- or  task-specific experience (e.g., Ost 2014; 
Gathmann and Schönberg 2010; and Clement, Koonce, and Lopez 2007). To our 
knowledge, however, this literature does not consider how experience’s value may 
vary with the complexity of a job; our study of earnings growth across heteroge-
neous situations offers novel evidence on this issue. The  well-established literature 
following Mincer (1974) offers additional evidence on the  wage-experience rela-
tionship, but this literature’s  life-cycle perspective on experience generally abstracts 
away from the details of human capital formation within individual jobs.2
2 See Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2003) for a survey. Recent research in this area (e.g., Dustmann and Meghir 
2005, Buchinsky et al. 2010, and Bagger et al. 2014) has largely focused on challenges related to endogenous labor 
force participation, job switching, and wage search. 
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I. The New York City Taxi Market
New York City’s yellow taxicabs serve customers who hail from the street, plus 
taxi queues at airports, train stations, and hotels. They are not permitted to accept 
customers in any other way. Other types of  for-hire vehicles (e.g., town cars and 
limousines) serve the market for  prearranged and  radio-dispatched transportation. 
In the NYC yellow taxi market, therefore, modern technologies, such as GPS, do not 
have a direct impact on the taxi driver’s fundamental problem of finding consumers 
whose demand for transportation has not yet been satisfied by another yellow cab or 
some other transportation mode.
During our sample period of 2009, there were 13,237 yellow cab taxi licenses 
(“medallions”) and about 40,000 additional  for-hire vehicles in New York City. 
Each medallion corresponds to a single yellow taxi, which may be controlled by an 
 owner-operator, a firm with a fleet of cabs, or an authorized leasing agent. The taxis 
are operated by drivers licensed by New York’s Taxi and Limousine Commission. 
The TLC reports that the number of licensed drivers was 48,521 at the end of 2009; 
not all licensed drivers operated a taxi during 2009.
Taxi drivers enter the market through a variety of avenues. Based on conver-
sations we have had with taxi fleet managers, it appears that very few drivers are 
“seasonal” in the sense that they take  multi-month breaks from driving a taxi before 
returning to the job. Schaller (2006) reports that, in 1991, 20 percent of TLC license 
applicants drove professionally in their previous job, with 44 percent of applicants 
having ever held a professional driving position (in New York or anywhere in the 
world). To obtain a TLC license, drivers are required to: hold a valid DMV license; 
attend either a  24-hour or  80-hour Taxicab School course; and pass tests on New 
York geography, TLC rules, and English language proficiency. New and experienced 
drivers are likely to differ on personal characteristics and performance. Schaller 
(2006) reports that experienced drivers receive fewer complaints for service prob-
lems such as refusing passengers, overcharging, treating passengers rudely or abu-
sively, or driving unsafely. Driver experience is also negatively correlated with the 
number of accidents and traffic violations (Schneider 2010).
Taxi earnings and costs are structured so that it is in the driver’s interest to max-
imize fare earnings during a shift. Drivers keep all fares and tips. Fares accrue as 
a function of ride distance and duration, and may include surcharges for nighttime 
rides, peak weekday rides, and destinations at airports or outside of New York City’s 
five boroughs. Drivers’ costs vary depending on their ownership of the taxis they 
drive. All drivers pay for their own gas ($5,000–$10,000 per year), annual TLC fees 
($100), and DMV/TLC fines for driving infractions. Drivers who lease their vehi-
cles pay a  per day or  per week flat fee; these fees were about $100 per day in 2009. 
 Owner-operators pay for annual maintenance and repair ($4,000–$10,000 per year), 
insurance ($7,000–$13,000 per year), and licensing fees ($1,000 per year). On 
average, a driver’s  take-home pay is 57 percent of revenue, with the rest divided 
among expenses paid by the driver and taxi owner (Schaller 2006). Driver earn-
ings vary with the time of day and day of the week, so some shifts are more lucra-
tive than others. Experienced drivers are generally sorted into the more valuable 
shifts; we document this pattern below. Our conversations with fleet  managers 
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The data we use in analysis are derived from a  fare-by-fare database of yellow 
taxi activity from the full 2009 calendar year. These data are collected by the TLC 
as part of an effort to monitor the activity of taxis and their drivers in the NYC area. 
The database includes all fares for licensed NYC cabs, even if an endpoint of a fare 
occurs outside of the city’s five boroughs.
We begin with a full database of 171 million observed fares received by 41,256 
active drivers. Each observation includes a unique  driver-specific index, the lon-
gitude, latitude, date, and time of the ride’s  pickup and  drop-off, and payments to 
the driver. Date and time are recorded to the second, and longitude and latitude are 
recorded through  on-board GPS.3 The total payment is broken down into the fare, 
surcharges, tip when the payment is via credit card, and MTA tax. The combina-
tion of driver identification codes and specific ride data allows us to construct a 
complete history of each driver’s activity during 2009. We define a shift as a suc-
cession of rides with  between-ride breaks no longer than five hours.4 We then track 
each  driver’s total fare earnings per shift, the shift’s duration, and running counts of 
the driver’s number of  drop-offs in each neighborhood. We also construct statistics 
within selected hours of a shift, including: fare earnings in the hour, slack time with 
no customer in the cab, ride duration, the number of fares collected, and average 
driving speed. Unfortunately we do not have additional information about the driv-
ers’ personal characteristics, employer’s identity, contract terms, or costs.
We clean and organize the data in order to conduct analysis of new versus expe-
rienced drivers. We remove drivers and shifts that are unlikely to represent the pro-
duction efforts of a regular driver in the market. In particular, we drop drivers who 
are associated with fewer than 100 fares, shifts associated with more than 1 unique 
car identifier, and shifts that were shorter than 2 hours or longer than 20 hours. This 
reduces the dataset to 165 million observations. Of the 6 million fare observations 
dropped in this step, 4 million are due to very long shifts, and 1.4 million are due to 
the use of multiple cars in a single shift.
Next, we separate drivers into groups by their level of experience. We identify 
27,664 drivers who first appeared in the data on or before January 15, 2009. Of these 
drivers, we retain 22,608 who worked at least 100 shifts between January 1 and 
December 31, and additionally worked at least 30 shifts before April 1. These driv-
ers are likely to have  pre-2009 experience in the market, while also working with 
enough frequency to maintain their stock of knowledge. To maintain tractability 
3 Longitude and latitude are reported to  one-foot precision, but tall buildings and other technical challenges are 
likely to distort these values somewhat. Small errors in location data will not affect our estimates, which use areas 
of several city blocks as the finest descriptors of taxi location. 
4 Farber (2015) uses the slightly different threshold of six hours to define a shift transition. 
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of the data, we select a 20 percent random sample of 4,522 drivers as our “experi-
enced” drivers in the analysis described below.
From the collection of drivers who fail the criteria for experienced drivers, we 
identify a subset who are likely to have entered the NYC taxi workforce in 2009 as 
new and inexperienced, and work with sufficient frequency to indicate an intention 
to function as a  full-time taxi driver in the market. To identify these new drivers, 
we isolated the sample to 4,033 drivers who were first observed in the data on or 
after April 1, 2009. Among these drivers, we select the 1,771 who worked at least 
50 shifts between their entry date and December 31, 2009, and had no more than 5 
shifts that violated the criteria for inclusion (multiple cars, shift length) mentioned 
above. It is possible that some of these drivers have prior experience in the NYC 
taxi market, but we cannot measure the size of this effect in the data. To address the 
possibility that some drivers are seasonal workers, we perform additional analysis 
(discussed below) with stricter inclusion criteria; our results are largely unchanged. 
To complete the selection of drivers and shifts for analysis, we limit both the experi-
enced and new driver samples to shifts that start between April 1 and December 31, 
2009.
We use the longitude and latitude information in the fare database to identify 
the NYC geographic region in which each  pickup and  drop-off occurs. We divide 
the market in two ways. First, we use the boundaries of Public Use Micro Areas 
(PUMAs) to identify 59 regions within the city’s 5 boroughs. PUMAs represent a 
fairly coarse division of the city; for example, one PUMA is defined by the portion of 
Manhattan west of Central Park and approximately bounded by the Park’s north and 
south edges. Second, we use the boundaries of 220 Neighborhood Tabulation Areas 
(NTAs), which are mostly nested within PUMAs and correspond more closely to 
conventional views of NYC neighborhoods. For example, the Lincoln Square area 
is a distinct NTA within the Manhattan PUMA described above. We employ both 
geographic boundaries in order to study the impact of “local” experience in large 
and small areas.
B. overall and  per Hour Driver Activity
Our analysis sample includes 1,771 new drivers and 4,522 experienced drivers 
whose activity we observe between April 1 and December 31, 2009. We present 
summary statistics on these drivers’ productivities in Table 1, separately reporting 
activity for experienced drivers, new drivers overall, and new drivers in their first 
20 shifts. We examine several productivity variables, including average earnings per 
hour and earnings within a specified hour of the shift. We generally focus on the 
60 minutes following a driver’s third  drop-off of a shift. For convenience we refer 
to this period as “ hour-R3” in our text and tables.  Hour-R3 roughly overlaps with a 
driver’s second hour of work.5 This hour is a microcosm of earning opportunities yet 
less likely to be affected by considerations about when to stop working or whether to 
5 For the median shift, this hour begins at minute 55 of the shift, and shifts at the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth 
percentiles begin at minutes 40 and 81, respectively. 
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take long  mid-shift breaks, which may differ between new and experienced drivers.6 
This also allows us to look directly at the  pickup and  drop-off times and locations 
of the driver’s final fare starting immediately before  hour-R3, plus the  pickup time 
and location of the next fare. In computing earnings in the hour following a  drop-off, 
we omit observations in which a driver has no customers for 60+ minutes. We infer 
that the driver is on a break, and is not attempting to find new customers.7 When 
 hour-R3’s final ride continues beyond the 60 minute  cut-off, we calculate the frac-
tion of the ride that took place in  hour-R3 and attribute that fraction of the relevant 
fare to  hour-R3.
The earnings statistics in Table 1 show that experienced and new drivers collect 
about the same value in fares per hour (approximately $26), but the median new 
driver in his first 20 shifts earns $1.39 less per hour (5.3 percent) than the median 
experienced driver. Similar differences emerge across drivers when we compare 
other measures of driver activity. Drivers in their first 20 shifts spend more time 
without a passenger. Average ride duration is greater for experienced drivers, despite 
these drivers taking more customers per hour. Average travel speed is about the same 
across drivers of all experience levels. Finally, new drivers work longer shifts, on 
average, compared to experienced drivers. Any differences displayed among drivers 
in this table, however, could be influenced by variation in market conditions when 
drivers of different experience levels are working.
In addition to differences in driving activity, in panel B of Table 1, we display 
some differences in working practices by new and experienced drivers. New and 
6 In addition, focus on  hour-R3 allows us to partially separate learning from drivers’ habituation to driving con-
ditions, such as sitting for many hours, which could be less important early in the shift. 
7 This rule affects 4 percent of our observations, and has no substantial effect on our results. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Experienced drivers New drivers New drivers, shift  ≤ 20
N = 839,888 N = 213,051 N = 34,420
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
panel A. shift-level summary statistics
Avg. hourly fare earnings in shift 25.87 26.00 5.63 25.84 25.86 5.05 24.56 24.61 5.13
Fare earnings in hour-R3 24.94 26.13 11.41 25.15 26.13 11.14 23.66 24.30 11.49
Percent of hour-R3 empty 48.85 46.53 22.99 48.87 46.67 22.78 52.10 50.00 22.90
Empty time (min.) after ride 3 13.74 5.43 25.80 12.94 6.00 21.84 14.30 7.00 22.51
Fares (dropoffs) in hour-R3 2.79 3.00 1.40 2.83 3.00 1.36 2.68 2.83 1.34
Avg. ride duration (min.) in hour-R3 12.55 10.71 8.38 12.34 10.62 7.90 12.20 10.45 8.47
Speed per ride (MPH) in hour-R3 12.75 11.32 17.89 12.60 11.25 9.43 12.64 11.32 8.15
Shift duration (hrs.) 8.99 9.00 2.75 9.32 9.48 2.20 9.49 9.68 2.15
N = 4,522 N = 1,771
panel B. Driver level summary statistics
Driver shifts 185.73 194.00 52.04 120.30 111.00 51.58
Share of days active 0.71 0.74 0.17 0.70 0.72 0.20
Number of cars per driver 9.62 2.00 17.86 18.52 10.00 19.71
Driver in single car? (Y = 1) 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.15 0.00 0.36
Notes: Sample contains shifts between April 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009 for the full sample of new drivers 
and 20 percent sample of experienced drivers. N in panel A corresponds to the main fare variable (fare earnings in 
hour-R3); some counts are smaller due to missing data.
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experienced drivers work a similar proportion of days following their first appearance 
in the analysis sample, although new drivers are observed for fewer shifts because 
of how they enter the sample. Some notable differences exist in the number of cars 
associated with each driver. While our data do not provide information on drivers’ 
relationship to cab owners, we observe that experienced drivers are over 200 percent 
more likely to be paired with a single taxi during the sample period. This suggests 
that the proportion of  owner-operators and  long-term lessees is larger in this pop-
ulation, which could provide experienced drivers with more flexibility in choosing 
work schedules and earning opportunities. The selection of experienced drivers into 
more lucrative schedules is evident in the data. Experienced drivers’ average fare per 
hour is negatively correlated (−0.72) with the share of new drivers. Across all 168 
 day-of-week/ hour-of-day combinations, experienced drivers in the top 10 percent 
by new driver share have average fare earnings of $21.37 per hour; experienced driv-
ers in the bottom 10 percent have average fare earnings of $30.80 per hour.
C. Geographic Data and  Location-specific Driver Activity
We use the geography data in three ways. First, we use a random sample of expe-
rienced drivers to construct statistics on driver performance within each  NTA-hour 
combination within a week (i.e., for each region a separate measure is constructed 
for each of 7 × 24 = 168 unique hours in the week).8 Using the  fare-level data, we 
calculate each experienced driver’s total earnings during the 60 minutes following a 
 drop-off in a specified  NTA-hour.9 We then average these earnings across all drivers 
in the same  NTA-hour, thereby computing a measure of how locations and times may 
vary in the earning opportunities available for drivers.10 Some  passenger-selected 
 drop-off locations may take the driver to a part of the city where (at a given time of 
day) it is especially easy to find the next customer, or perhaps find customers who 
are likely to request rides to  high-earning areas. With these measures of average 
earnings within neighborhoods and times, we can characterize some situations as 
“easy” or “hard” production opportunities, and investigate how new driver perfor-
mance varies with task difficulty.
In Figure 1, we provide an illustration of how earning opportunities vary across 
the city, and to what extent they vary across the hours following 8 am, 3 pm, and 
10 pm on Tuesdays, and 10 pm on Saturday.11 To construct the figure we first weight 
the  NTA-hour earnings statistics by the number of experienced driver  drop-offs 
within each  NTA-hour, and then we split these values into quartiles.12 The first 
8 We use data from experienced drivers who are not in the main analysis sample. 
9 When a ride straddles the  cutoff time of a particular hour, we calculate the fraction of the ride that occurred in 
the relevant hour, and then assign this fraction of the ride’s total fare to the hour. 
10 The calculation omits rides that are not followed by four or more rides within the driver’s shift (17.5 percent 
of observations) to reduce the influence of endogenous  shift-ending behavior. We also omit drivers with earnings of 
zero in the hour, which coincides with our rule in the regression analysis. Finally, we drop all  NTA-hours with fewer 
than 10 observations over the entire sample period, which corresponds to the bottom 10 percent of the distribution 
of  NTA-hour observations. 
11 In order to minimize concerns about drivers favoring particular neighborhoods at the ends of their shifts, we 
select hours that are different from typical  shift-end times. 
12 If locations with low mean earnings also have fewer  drop-offs, the weighting will partition the  NTA-hours so 
that more than 25 percent of unique  NTA-hours are assigned to the  lowest earning quartile. 
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 quartile (lightest shading) represents the lowest average earnings ($20.08 on aver-
age) in the hour following a  drop-off, and the fourth quartile (darkest shading) con-
tains the highest average earnings ($32.62). Some NTAs (largely on Staten Island) 
are unshaded because fewer than ten rides terminated in those neighborhoods during 
an hour of the week. Lower Manhattan is at its most lucrative around rush hours 
and on weekend evenings, while the Bronx contains many neighborhoods in the 
 lowest-earning quartile. The eastern portions of Brooklyn and Queens have rela-
tively high average earnings, likely because of their proximity to John F. Kennedy 
airport, from which the TLC mandated a flat fare of $45 for the most common des-
tinations (i.e.,  drop-offs in Manhattan).
Our second use of geographic data is to construct measures of location-specific 
experience by new drivers. For each new driver and shift we compute as  d it the driv-
er’s cumulative number of completed  drop-offs between the new driver’s first shift 






Panel A. Tuesday 8 AM Panel B. Tuesday 3 PM
















Figure 1. NTA/DOW/HH-Level Difficulty Measures by Location of Drop-Off
Notes: Sample corresponds to 80 percent of experienced drivers (January 1–December 31, 
2009). Difficulty is defined by an NTA/Day-of-the-Week/Hour-of-the-Day-specific measure of 
the total fare earnings in the 60 minutes following a drop-off. This variable is split into quartiles, 
weighted by the number of rides. The fourth quartile corresponds to the “easiest” quartile (i.e., 
highest average fare). 8 am corresponds to the hour falling between 8 am and 9 am (and similarly 
for the other reported hours). The maps exclude five NTAs that straddle geographic boundaries 
and are difficult to render in the figure.
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prior to  hour-R3 in each NTA and PUMA, which we index by n and p, respectively. 
Let  d int represent driver i’s cumulative  drop-offs in NTA n through shift t, and let  d ipt 
capture the  drop-offs in PUMA p. When working with local  drop-offs at the NTA 
level (e.g., Lincoln Square) we can calculate the number of  drop-offs in the same 
PUMA but outside of the NTA (e.g., Upper West Side excluding Lincoln Square), 
plus separately the number of  drop-offs outside of the NTA’s PUMA (e.g., all of 
NYC outside of Upper West Side). We denote  drop-offs in the same PUMA as n 
but outside of the NTA as  d i,−n,p,t, and we write  d i,−p,t for the count of  drop-offs 
outside of the PUMA in which ride three’s  drop-off occurred. The count  d i,−p,t 
(and to a lesser extent  d i,−n,p,t )  stands-in for “general” experience in the sense that 
 location-independent expertise should be developed equally well inside and outside 
of a  drop-off neighborhood. On Table 2 we report some summary statistics on new 
drivers’ cumulative  drop-offs. Across all new drivers in the analysis sample, the 
average value of  d it is 1,711 with 17 percent (7 percent) of  drop-offs in the same 
PUMA (NTA) as ride three’s  drop-off PUMA (NTA). These  drop-off shares hold 
for new drivers in their first 20 shifts as well, and for these cases represent substan-
tially smaller levels of prior local experience.
Finally, we use the geography data to connect some individual rides’  drop-off 
locations with the  pickup locations of the next customers. In particular, we cre-
ate variables to indicate whether a new driver performs his ride-three  drop-off and 
subsequent pickup (the first new fare of  hour-R3) in the same or different NTA 
or PUMA. While we do not observe search decisions directly, this provides some 
information on how widely drivers search for their next customer. In Table 2 we 
show that new drivers, on average, switch NTAs following half of all fares, and new 
drivers in their first 20 shifts are slightly more likely to switch.
III. Empirical Analysis
We estimate a variety of econometric models to satisfy our research objectives. 
Our models measure how market outcomes (e.g., an hour’s fares) vary across drivers 
with different amounts of experience. We perform our main analysis with a fairly 
simple econometric framework. Let  y it be driver i’s productivity during shift t; in 
most cases this is (a function of) fare earnings during a specified hour of shift t. The 
new driver’s vector of experience at shift t is  E it . We specify  E it to contain the driv-
er’s current shift number ( e it ), his cumulative number of  drop-offs ( d it ) completed 
before ride three of shift t, and his  location-specific numbers of  drop-offs (e.g.,  d int ). 
These counts of experience begin with the new driver’s first appearance in the 2009 
data; similar variables cannot be constructed for experienced drivers. We measure 
the impact of E on y with the function g(E;  θ ), where  θ is our main parameter vec-
tor of interest. Across specifications we vary the collection of experience measures 
included in g as well as g’s functional form. In general we regard a new driver’s 
shift number (e) as a better exogenous measure of experience than his count of 
 drop-offs (d ), as  above-average performance leads directly to a faster accumulation 
of d. Some  location-specific variables are measured through  drop-offs, however, so 
we use d where necessary and after establishing that our main results are robust to 
either variable.
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We introduce several controls for market-, location-, and  driver-specific hetero-
geneity. Let the fixed effect  α hn represent the potential production (in terms of y) of 
an experienced driver during hour h, whose third fare of shift t had  drop-off NTA n. 
In some cases we apply the same fixed effect,  α h =  α hn , to all locations in the city 
for the specific hour h. Our models generally include a different  α h value for each 
distinct hour in the dataset, i.e., one for each of 6,600 hours of our analysis  sample 
between 12 am April 1 through 11 pm December 31, 2009. Models that include 
 location-specific differences, i.e.,  α hn , include a full interaction of NTA identifi-
ers with each hour in the dataset. Whether specified as  α h or  α hn , the fixed effects 
account for demand and supply fluctuations over time that may influence all drivers’ 
earnings during t. This may include regular variation in demand (e.g., rush hours), 
idiosyncratic variation in demand (e.g., weather), and seasonal effects. In addition 
to the α terms, in many models we include  driver-level fixed effects, denoted  δ d , 
which allow individual drivers to have their own average output levels. In the case 
of new drivers, the value  δ d represents the  individual-specific deviation from  α hn 
when the driver has no experience. In addition to  α hn and  δ d , we account for some 
observable driver and market characteristics in  X it . All of our specifications include 
in  X it the log of shift t’s full duration in hours; this accounts for potential differences 
in drivers’ effort exertion across long versus short shifts. We implement some addi-
tional analysis by adding variables to  X it . Finally, we include the error term  ε it to 
account for  driver-shift level unobservables in production. Driver production and 
learning are likely to be correlated within driver over time, so we cluster  ε it at the 
driver level during estimation.
We combine the components described above into the econometric model
(1)  y it = g ( E it , θ) +  X it β +  α hn +  δ d +  ε it .
Across our specifications, we employ a variety of assumptions on y, g, E, X, α, 
and δ; these variations are explained below as the models are introduced. In 
our final set of models, in which we describe drivers’ choices when search-
ing for their next fares, we use the same collection of explanatory variables and 
controls.
Table 2—Summary Statistics
New drivers New drivers, shift  ≤ 20
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Drop-offs prior to ride 3 of shift  t 212,918 1,711.08 1,420.00 1,304.93 34,391 220.03 210.00 143.96
Prior drop-offs in same PUMA
 as ride 3
210,444 289.65 191.00 317.39 34,037 37.83 27.00 38.18
Prior drop-offs in same NTA
 as ride 3
208,953 127.75 69.00 171.33 33,819 16.65 9.00 20.78
Switch NTA after ride 3? (Y = 1) 208,428 0.50 0.00 0.50 33,739 0.53 1.00 0.50
Note: Sample contains new drivers’ shifts between April 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009.
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A. overall measures of Learning
We begin by focusing on driver earnings during  hour-R3, and we estimate (1) 
with y specified as the log of total fare earnings during  hour-R3 of a shift. We assess 
the impact of parametric assumptions in g( E it ;  θ ) with an initial pair of models. In 
the first model, we assume g( E it ;  θ ) =  θ log( e it ). In the second, we specify that e 
enters g with dummy variables in  ten-shift intervals, each with its own coefficient:
(2)   g ( E it ; θ) =   γ 1 1 {1 ≤  e it ≤ 10} +  γ 2 1 {11 ≤  e it ≤ 20} 
 +    γ 3 1 {21 ≤  e it ≤ 30} + ⋯  +  γ 14 1 {131 ≤  e it ≤ 140} .
The second model has new drivers with 141+ shifts as the excluded category. Both 
models include data from experienced drivers (who have g = 0),  driver-level fixed 
effects ( δ i ), and a full set of controls ( α hn ) for each  hour-location combination.
In Figure 2 we display results from the initial models, which show rapid produc-
tivity improvements among new drivers.13 The more flexible approach to g shows 
that new drivers’ earnings plateau after about 40 shifts. The figure also shows that 
there is little difference between the two approaches’ results, which provides rea-
sonable support for moving forward with the more concise log specification in the 
analysis below.
13 The parameter estimates from the log specification are reported in Table 3, specification 3. The estimates from 






































New driver: Number of shifts since starting
Dummies log(e)
Figure 2. Evaluation of Parametric (log) versus Nonparametric (dummy) Approaches
Notes: The solid line corresponds to Table 3, specification 3, and uses a natural log specifica-
tion for g(E). We impose an intercept value of −0.07 on the solid line in order to match the 
intercept of the dashed line; the intercept value is not identified due to the inclusion of driver 
fixed effects. The dashed line corresponds to Appendix Table 2, Specification 4, and uses a col-
lection of dummy variables for g(E).
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In our next analysis, we investigate the importance of sample selection issues on 
drivers’ overall earnings. We estimate a series of models with experience captured 
as log(e) or log(d), and we report our results in Table 3. In specification 1 we include 
data on new drivers only, and without controls for date and time. Without these 
controls for market conditions, we find a large effect of experience on productivity. 
Specification 1’s results imply a 21 percent difference in log earnings between the 
first and one hundredth shift, or a 23 percent difference in level earnings.14 In spec-
ification 2, we introduce fixed effects,  α hn , that interact the hour of the full dataset 
with the location of ride 3’s  drop-off, plus we add data on experienced drivers to 
provide additional information on demand conditions. The learning rate falls by 
half in specification 2, and the presence of experienced drivers provides an esti-
mate of the production gap for brand new drivers (9 percent). In specification 3, we 
add  driver-level fixed effects,  δ d , to measure purely  within-driver improvements in 
y with experience.15 The learning rate estimate from this specification is roughly 
70 percent of the magnitude in specification 2, but  within-driver learning remains 
statistically significant at p < 0.01. The learning coefficient of 0.015 implies that a 
driver in his one hundredth shift receives earnings that are 7 percent greater, on aver-
age, than a driver in his first shift. In specification 4, we replace  e it with  d it , the new 
14 We compute the log earnings difference by multiplying the learning coefficient (0.045) by log(100). To obtain 
the difference in level earnings we compute exp[0.045 × log(100)] − 1. 
15 We obtain virtually the same results when including the simpler  date-by-hour fixed effect ( α h ) in place of  α hn . 
In some analysis below we use  α h instead of  α hn because of computational constraints. 
Table 3—Driver Experience and Productivity Improvements
Dependent variable log(hour-R3 fares) log(hour-R3 fares) log(hour-R3 fares) log(hour-R3 fares)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
New driver −0.085
(0.007)
New  × log(shift) 0.045 0.021 0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)






No Yes Yes Yes
Date × hour × drop-off 
 NTA fixed effects?
No Yes Yes Yes
Driver fixed effects? No No Yes Yes
Observations 204,406 977,947 908,042 908,042
 r 2 0.008 0.397 0.357 0.357
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. “Hour-R3 Fares’’ is the sum of all 
fares within the first 60 minutes following the third drop-off of a shift, including fractional fares for those rides that 
straddle the end of the hour. The variable log(shift) corresponds to the logarithm of the shift count, where shift = 1 
for the first shift observed for the driver in 2009. The variable log(drop-offs) corresponds to the total number of 
drop-offs observed for the driver in 2009 prior to the third drop-off of the current shift. All models control for the 
logarithm of the current shift’s total length in hours.
VoL. 9 No. 1 83Haggag et al.: learning by Driving
driver’s stock of  drop-offs through ride 3 of shift t; our results are largely unchanged 
with this alternative experience measure.16
We are able to use the results from Table 3 together with statistics on driver work 
patterns to calculate the dollar value of learning, i.e., the information cost of driver 
inexperience in the market. We focus on the first 100 shifts of driver activity, when 
most learning takes place. If we apply the slope coefficient in specification 3 to pre-
dicted earnings under the assumptions of an average shift length (9.19 hours) and 
 per-hour fare earnings ($26.42) for new drivers with 100 shifts, we find that new 
drivers lose $344 in fare earnings during the first 100 shifts due to inexperience. 
For the approximately 4,000 new drivers who arrive in NYC after March 31, this 
totals $1.4 million in lost fare earnings due to inexperience in the market. The large 
learning coefficient of specification 1, by contrast, implies $1,016 in lost fares per 
driver. The difference between the lost earnings values using specifications 1 and 3 
suggests that new driver selection into unfavorable shifts reduces earnings by about 
$672.17 While our preferred estimate of the overall reduction in fare earnings during 
the first 100 shifts is small (1.4 percent of fares), the absolute dollar difference is 
a larger proportion (about 2.5 percent) of a driver’s  take-home pay due to vehicle 
rental expenses and other fixed costs of operating a taxi.18 In addition, compen-
sation through tips, which are influenced by both fare earnings and the number of 
distinct rides, are likely to increase with the driver’s experience.
Our estimates imply that learning occurs quickly (i.e., over a few months of 
shifts) and accounts for a fairly small share of driver earnings. The LBD literature 
as a whole contains a wide variety of learning rates, only some of which are similar 
to ours. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) estimate learning paths from a variety of 
industries and firms; some are quite similar to our results, while others show greater 
increases in productivity. Levitt, List, Syverson (2013) find that learning occurs over 
a similar time interval as we do, although the productivity differences they measure 
are much larger. Hendel and Spiegel (2014) study a case in which  firm-level learn-
ing occurs continually over many years. The variety of activities observed could be 
a source of this heterogeneity. Moreover, LBD at the organizational level could offer 
opportunities for more sustained improvements through changes to communication 
and coordination among agents.
B. Driving Activities and outcomes
New drivers’ earning improvements are robust in the data, but they leave open the 
question of what drivers might be doing to generate these improvements. While we 
do not directly observe all relevant choices by drivers, we can analyze how several 
16 Our results are robust to alternative assumptions to identify new drivers. In the online Appendix, we report 
results from models in which we use a later  cutoff date (May 1), and additional models in which we require new 
drivers to be active during every month after their first appearance in the data. The former approach reduces the 
chance that an experienced driver on an extended break will be misidentified as new, and the latter reduces the 
impact of driver attrition. 
17 The results of Table 3’s specification 1 are unchanged if we add driver fixed effects. 
18 We calculate the total change using the relevant statistic on  take-home pay provided in Section II. 
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outcomes vary with experience. To perform this analysis, we adapt the empirical 
model in (1) so  y represents these additional measures of outcomes and activities.
In specifications 1 and 2 of Table 4, we track improvements in a critical driver 
activity: reducing the amount of time between customers. The specifications differ 
in whether  driver-level fixed effects are included. While specification 1, which lacks 
these controls, may be affected by driver attrition, it provides a useful intercept term 
that describes differences between  brand new drivers and experienced ones. In both 
specifications we find that driver experience, as captured by cumulative shifts (e), 
has a significant effect on reducing slack time between passengers. Specification 1’s 
estimated intercept term reveals that brand new drivers spend about 10 percent 
more time searching for their next customer. At the experienced driver mean of 
13.7 minutes between customers, this implies an additional 1.4 minutes of search 
time. As in the analysis above, controlling for  driver-specific heterogeneity reduces 
the impact of experience on driver performance, but the coefficient on driver experi-
ence remains statistically significant. We interpret this result (and the others in this 
paper) on improved performance as due to a driver’s independent observation of 
taxi demand in various NYC neighborhoods. An additional mechanism, which we 
cannot measure with the present data, is that a club of experienced drivers gradually 
releases information about (or permission to serve) lucrative locations to new driv-
ers who gain tenure in the market. While possible, our results in total suggest that 
this mechanism is likely to be less important than independent learning.
Other aspects of drivers’ activity change with experience as well. In specification 
3, we report that newer drivers have  lower-mileage trips, on average, which may 
be due to the areas in which they search for customers. While our fixed effects in 
α hn control for the location from which the driver begins searching the next fare, 
Table 4—Changes to Activities and Outcomes
Dependent variable log(empty time log(empty time log(hour-R3 avg log(hour-R3 log(hour-R3
between fares) between fares) miles per ride) avg. speed) avg. speed)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
New driver 0.101
(0.012)
New  × log(shift) −0.025 −0.016 0.007 0.013 0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
log(hour-R3 avg. miles 0.390
 per ride) (0.002)
Date × hour × drop-off
 NTA fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,031,633 953,870 911,793 911,296 911,296
 r 2 0.435 0.378 0.219 0.412 0.691
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. “Empty time between fares’’ is the 
number of minutes between the third drop-off and the fourth pick-up. “Hour-R3 avg. miles per ride’’ is the num-
ber of miles traveled with passengers divided by the number of fares within the hour. “Hour-R3 avg. speed’’ is total 
miles with passengers divided by the number of minutes with passengers in the taxi. The variable log(shift) cor-
responds to the logarithm of the shift count, where shift = 1 for the first shift observed for the driver in 2009. All 
models control for the logarithm of the current shift’s total length in hours.
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experienced drivers may make different choices about where to search or which 
customers to pick up following a  drop-off. In our final analyses on Table 4, we inves-
tigate whether experienced drivers are able to pilot their vehicles more quickly while 
transporting passengers. (We do not observe miles traveled when the driver has no 
passenger, so we cannot compute speed at other times.) We find in specification 4 
that drivers with more experience are able to travel more quickly. This could be due 
to the types of fares they take, which may require travel on  higher speed roads, or it 
could be due to expertise in navigating city streets. We attempt to account for differ-
ences in trip composition in specification 5, where we add a control for the average 
distance of a driver’s fare during an hour. Adding this variable, which can account 
for longer trips on  higher-speed roads, only slightly diminishes the impact of expe-
rience on speed, with the coefficient remaining positive and statistically significant.
Table 4’s analysis leaves open the question of which types of actions or outcomes 
are most important across drivers, and thus between new and experienced drivers. 
We address this question in a series of models in which we consider how much 
 hour-R3 earnings variance is explained by the share of the hour spent without a 
passenger, average ride distance, and average driving speed. (We do not report the 
models’ coefficient estimates because they are unimportant to our analysis.) As a 
baseline, we estimate a version of equation (1) that contains no experience term 
(g = 0) but retains the fixed effects  α hn and  δ i . As captured through  r 2 , this model 
explains 36 percent of variation in  hour-R3 earnings. When we add to the model 
(in X ) each driver’s share of  hour-R3 without a passenger, the new specification 
explains 74 percent of earnings variation. The other variables (average distance and 
speed), by contrast, improve the explained variation by only 6 or 7 percentage points 
each. When all three variables are included, the model accounts for 84 percent of the 
variation in earnings. While the driver’s realized time spent without a passenger is 
affected by a variety of factors (including strategy and luck), these models demon-
strate that finding passengers is the critical activity that affects drivers’ earnings.
C.  Customer-selected Destinations as a randomizing Device
Some of our empirical analysis below relies on an assumption that drivers are 
randomized into locations across the city based on the requested destinations of 
their customers. While drivers can control where they pick up customers, they do 
not determine the  drop-off location.19 Contrary to our assumption, if drivers gain 
expertise in selecting customers who are likely to request rides to more lucrative 
 drop-off locations, then some of their measured improvements in fares will be due to 
the ability to avoid arriving in difficult situations rather than performing well within 
them. This would be a different sort of learning than interests us here.
We evaluate our randomization assumption by investigating whether new and 
experienced drivers are different in how lucrative their  drop-off locations are. As 
19 While drivers may refuse fares occasionally in practice, doing so is against TLC regulations and can result 
in punishment. In 2009 the refusal punishment was $200–$350 for a first offense, $ 350–500 and a possible  30-day 
license suspension for a second offense, and a mandatory license revocation for a third offense. The TLC received 
about 2,000 formal complaints per year in 2009 and 2010. 
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detailed in Section IIC, we measure the value of an NTA within a particular hour of 
the week by calculating the mean earnings across experienced drivers for the 60 min-
utes following a  drop-off in that  NTA-hour combination; we use the log of this mea-
sure to characterize  ride-3 destinations. Continuing with our analysis sample of new 
and experienced drivers, we regress this logged mean earnings variable on measures 
of experience, captured here with a dummy variable for new drivers and the new 
drivers’ log(e). We report our results on Table 5. Specification 1 includes data from 
both new and experienced drivers, but no fixed effects at the  date-by-hour ( α h ) or 
 date-by-hour-by-location ( α hn ) level. We report that new drivers are transported to 
significantly  lower earning destinations, and their outcomes improve as they gain 
experience. This pattern, however, is due to sorting of new drivers into  low-earning 
shifts. In specification 2 we add  date-by-hour fixed effects ( α h ) to the model, and 
the estimated coefficients are reduced by over a factor of 20. The coefficients in 
specification 2 show no economically significant difference in  drop-off locations 
between new and experienced drivers. This result is sustained in specification 3, 
where we add driver fixed effects to focus on  within-driver improvements. Finally, 
in specification 4, we retain driver fixed effects and replace  α h with  α hn , which in 
this case has n defined as the starting NTA of the driver’s third ride of shift t. This 
allows us to ask whether drivers gain expertise in selecting customers from within a 
given neighborhood; we find no significant effect of driver experience on destination 
mean earnings. We conclude that drivers do not improve in their ability to identify 
customers who will take them to  high-earning neighborhoods. The improvement, 
instead, appears to be primarily in locating the next customer following a  drop-off. 
To the extent that drivers tend to refuse customers who may appear to request 
rides to  low-earning areas, this behavior is not correlated with driver experience in 
our data.
Table 5—Tests of Randomization Assumption
Dependent variable log(mean earnings at ride 3 drop-off)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
New driver −0.0415 −0.0015
(0.0045) (0.0006)
New  × log(shift) 0.0088 0.0004 0.0004 −0.0000
(0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 3.2793 3.2779
(0.0014) (0.0001)
Date × hour fixed effects? No Yes Yes No
Date × hour × pick-up NTA fixed effects? No No No Yes
Driver fixed effects? No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,031,352 1,031,352 1,031,346 979,833
 r 2 0.001 0.840 0.843 0.879
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. The dependent variable’s mean earn-
ings refers to the average across experienced drivers in the same NTA, day-of-week, and hour-of-day. The variable 
log(shift) corresponds to the logarithm of the shift count, where shift = 1 for the first shift observed for the driver 
in 2009. All models control for the logarithm of the current shift’s total length in hours.
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D. productivity, Learning, and Difficulty
One strength of our data is that we can examine how new drivers’ production 
improves across a variety of situations. This allows us to draw conclusions about 
the impact of experience on wages and productivity across different economic con-
ditions. In the broader economy, this would be analogous to estimating different 
returns to experience across different macroeconomic conditions or circumstances 
facing a firm. In studies of worker wage dynamics, a similar treatment may be given 
to estimating different returns to experience across different occupations or tasks, 
which can differ in their rigor.
For this analysis, we return to the  NTA-hour (of week) quartiles that we con-
structed for Figure 1, including the weighting by number of  drop-offs. Difficult (first 
quartile)  NTA-hour combinations have relatively low earnings in the hour following 
a  drop-off. We estimate a regression model that allows new drivers to have different 
expected earnings at the start of their career in each difficulty quartile, experience 
different rates of improvement in each quartile, and allows experienced drivers to 
vary in their average earnings across difficulty quartiles as well. The base model is
(3)  log (hour-r3   fare it ) =  ∑ 
q=1
4
 (1 { Q it = q} × 1 {i new} ×  [ θ 0q +  θ 1q log ( e it ) ] ) 
 +    ∑ 
q=1
3
 1 { Q it = q}  μ q +  X it β +  α hn +  δ d +  ε it .
The variable  Q it contains the difficulty quartile (q) in which driver i  drops-off his 
third customer, starting  hour-R3. 1{·} is the indicator function. New drivers have a 
different intercept ( θ 0q ) and learning coefficient ( θ 1q ) for each possible difficulty 
quartile. These parameters capture, respectively, the productivity lag of brand new 
drivers across different quartiles and the rate at which new drivers’ production 
improves across quartiles as they accumulate experience (e). Experienced drivers in 
the bottom three quartiles have earnings that differ by  μ q from the (excluded) earn-
ings of experienced drivers in the easiest quartile. We can estimate the  μ q parameters 
when we restrict  α hn =  α h across all locations, but these coefficients drop out in our 
more general treatment of  α hn . The control variables (X ), driver fixed effects (δ), 
and error term (ε) are all defined as in the models discussed above.
We report the results of this analysis in Table 6. In specification 1, we omit driver 
fixed effects and restrict  α hn =  α h . We find that driver productivity, as measured 
through  hour-R3 earnings (log earnings), is 14 percent (15 percent) lower for brand 
new drivers operating in the most difficult quartile than it is for experienced drivers 
in the same quartile. Experienced drivers in the most difficult quartile, in turn, have 
earnings (log earnings) that are 31 percent (38 percent) below those of experienced 
drivers in the easiest quartile. New drivers in the middle two quartiles start their 
driving careers 11 percent and 8 percent below the productivity of experienced driv-
ers, while drivers in the easiest quartile are just 2 percent below experienced drivers. 
While new drivers perform substantially worse than experienced drivers in difficult 
situations, their performance improves more quickly in more difficult quartiles.
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We extend our analysis in specification 2, where we include fixed effects at the 
 location-hour level,  α hn . We also add  driver-level fixed effects, which require us to 
remove one intercept parameter for new drivers, so we normalize new driver per-
formance relative to those who serve the easiest quartile. The qualitative results of 
specification 1 are preserved in specification 2. New drivers lag behind experienced 
drivers by substantially more in difficult settings, but new drivers also improve rel-
atively quickly in these settings. If we assume a 10.5 percent earnings gap between 
brand new and experienced drivers in the most difficult quartile, the learning rate 
θ 01 in specification 2 implies that new drivers require 67 shifts to eliminate the 
 difference between themselves and the incumbents.20 Drivers in the  second-easiest 
quartile require 55 shifts to eliminate a gap of 6 percent.
20 We assume a 10.5 percent earnings gap because this is the sum of the  first-to-fourth quartile gap for brand 
new drivers in specification 2 (−0.083), plus the fourth quartile gap between new and experienced drivers in 
Table 6—Productivity across Different Difficulties
Dependent variable log(hour-R3 fares) log(hour-R3 fares)
Specification (1) (2)
New  × Q1 location −0.154 −0.083
(0.015) (0.017)
New  × Q2 location −0.113 −0.068
(0.010) (0.013)
New  × Q3 location −0.076 −0.038
(0.010) (0.010)
New  × Q4 location −0.022
(0.009)
New  × Q1  × log(shift) 0.034 0.025
(0.004) (0.004)
New  × Q2  × log(shift) 0.026 0.020
(0.002) (0.002)
New  × Q3  × log(shift) 0.021 0.015
(0.002) (0.002)








Date × hour fixed effects? Yes No
Date × hour × drop-off NTA fixed effects? No Yes
Driver fixed effects? No Yes
Observations 977,744 908,042
 r 2 0.181 0.357
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. Difficulty is defined by an NTA/Day-
of-the-week/hour-of-the-day-specific measure of the total fare earnings in the 60 minutes following a drop-off. This 
variable is split into quartiles, weighted by the number of rides. The fourth quartile corresponds to the “easiest’’ 
quartile, i.e., highest average fare. The variable log(shift) corresponds to the logarithm of the shift count, where 
shift = 1 for the first shift observed for the driver in 2009. All models control for the log of the shift length in hours.
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E. General and specific Experience
Our next set of analyses employs separate measures of driver experience across 
locations. In the NYC taxi market, we are able to track how a new driver’s per-
formance in a specific neighborhood is related to the driver’s prior experience in 
the same neighborhood and his overall experience. This exercise relates to a large 
labor literature (e.g., Becker 1964) that examines the degree to which human cap-
ital acquired on the job is general or more specific, and therefore less transferable 
across jobs. While the bulk of this literature focuses on general versus occupation-, 
industry-, or  firm-specific human capital, there is also interest in the degree to which 
human capital gains are  task-specific (Gibbons and Waldman 2004).21 Our data pro-
vides a unique opportunity to add to this literature using a large dataset, precise mea-
sures of  task-specific (i.e.,  location-specific) experience, and a simple identification 
argument. Specifically, for each driver, we observe a large number of randomizing 
events in which customers ask for  drop-offs in a variety of neighborhoods, which 
themselves vary in their earning opportunities and (perhaps) optimal strategies for 
finding customers.
We perform this analysis using functions of new drivers’  drop-off tallies, i.e., 
 d int ,  d ipt ,  d i,−n,p,t , and  d i,−p,t . We vary whether PUMA or NTA is the finest geographic 
area for which we include a local experience measure. Throughout this analysis we 
allow each experience measure, d, to enter g(E;  θ ) as  θ j log (1 + d) , where j indexes 
an individual entry in θ. In all models we include the fixed effects  α hn and  δ i . In these 
models the  location-specific fixed effect helps control for the possibility that driv-
ers accumulate more experience in neighborhoods that have greater demand, which 
could create positive correlation between  d int and earnings due to forces uncon-
nected to learning.
We report in Table 7 our results on local and general experience. Our first spec-
ification adapts Table 3’s specification 4 by including  d ipt and  d i,−p,t to account for 
 PUMA-level experience. The results indicate that both types of experience are sig-
nificantly correlated with fare earnings and have similar impacts. A driver in his 
one hundredth shift averages about 382  drop-offs in a PUMA, and the coefficient 
estimate of 0.007 suggests that these  drop-offs lead to earnings that are 4.2 percent 
greater than those of a driver with no  drop-offs in a PUMA. In specification 2, 
we narrow our focus by including the new driver’s (logged) number of previous 
 drop-offs in ride 3’s destination NTA ( d int ), the number in the same PUMA but in 
different NTAs ( d i,−n,p,t ), and the number outside of the NTA’s PUMA ( d i,−p,t ). We 
find that  NTA-level experience has a significant impact on fare earnings, as does 
experience outside of the  drop-off PUMA. The number of  drop-offs in the same 
PUMA but different NTAs has an insignificant impact on earnings after ride 3.
Table 7’s specifications  1–2 imply that  nonlocal experience has a significant 
impact on earnings, which might be due to the benefits of overall experience. An 
specification 1 (−0.022). To calculate the number of shifts (e) before new and experienced drivers converge in 
 hardest-quartile earnings, we solve −0.105 + 0.025 × log(e) = 0. 
21 For example, Ost (2014) studies teacher grade switches to evaluate whether productivity gains are specific to 
a task (e.g., years teaching the fifth versus seventh grade) or more general (years teaching overall). 
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additional explanation, however, is that earnings for the full  hour-R3 include out-
comes following a driver’s fourth (and later)  drop-off, and these are often in neigh-
borhoods other than ride 3’s destination, and therefore the driver could be benefiting 
from knowledge about different specific locations. We address this possibility by 
considering in specification 3 the driver’s time without a passenger after ride 3, 
using the same logged duration variable as in Table 4. This analysis places a tighter 
focus on drivers’ outcomes immediately after ride 3, where performance following 
later rides does not affect the dependent variable. In specification 3, we find that the 
driver’s slack time falls as prior experience in the  drop-off PUMA increases, but 
experience outside of the PUMA has no effect on slack time. Specification 4 repeats 
the analysis of specification 2, and we find that drivers locate passengers faster when 
they have more experience in the same NTA. Experience outside of the  drop-off 
NTA, however, has no significant effect on the duration until the driver finds his next 
passenger. While these results suggest that local experience may be all that matters 
for taxi drivers, we note that drivers’ objectives are likely to be more closely tied 
to maximizing fare earnings than to reducing time between a pair of rides. In total, 
Table 7’s results consistently indicate the importance of local experience in new 
drivers’ productivity growth.
F. search Decisions and  Neighborhood-switching
While we cannot study the full details of drivers’ decisions with the present data, 
we are able to analyze whether a driver has switched neighborhoods to find his 
next fare. We take this outcome as a reasonable proxy for the driver’s choices about 
where to search. For this analysis we continue in the same vein described above, 
replacing y in (1) with an indicator variable for whether a driver’s  ride-4  pickup 
Table 7—Location-Specific Experience and Productivity
Dependent variable log(empty time log(empty time
log(hour-R3 fares) log(hour-R3 fares) between fares) between fares)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
New  × log(drop-offs 0.008 0.008 −0.001 −0.002
 outside PUMA) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
New  × log(drop-offs 0.007 −0.015
 inside PUMA) (0.002) (0.003)
New  × log(drop-offs 0.003 0.001
 Inside PUMA, outside NTA) (0.002) (0.003)
New  × log(drop-offs 0.004 −0.016
 inside NTA) (0.002) (0.003)
Date × hour × drop-off NTA
 fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 908,042 908,042 953,870 953,870
 r 2 0.357 0.357 0.378 0.378
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. All models control for the logarithm 
of the current shift’s total length in hours.
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is in a different NTA than his  ride-3  drop-off. We use linear probability models to 
estimate this outcome. To tie switching decisions to drivers’ experience, we con-
tinue with the  location-specific measures of experience that we employ in Table 7: 
 d int ,  d i,−n,p,t , and  d i,−p,t . We include  driver-level (δ) and  location-hour ( α hn ) fixed 
effects in each model. The data on experienced drivers serve to provide average 
switching frequencies for individual  location-hour combinations from which new 
drivers might deviate.
Our results, which we report in Table 8, show that drivers switch locations more 
frequently as they gain overall experience in the market, and they are less likely to 
leave individual neighborhoods in which they have more experience. In specification 
1 of Table 8, we report results from the full analysis sample, and we find that over-
all experience (outside of the  drop-off’s PUMA),  within-PUMA experience, and 
 NTA-level experience each have a significant effect on whether the driver changes 
neighborhoods following a  drop-off. The largest effect is due to local experience, 
which suggests that drivers are more inclined to search for their next customers in 
areas where they have previously spent more time observing the market. The pos-
itive coefficients on  d i,−n,p,t and  d i,−p,t suggest that drivers may be more willing to 
leave a neighborhood, holding local experience constant, if they have more expe-
rience elsewhere. These results are contrary to what we would expect if strategic 
experimentation incentives dominated; if so, new drivers would be more likely to 
switch NTAs when their local experience is relatively large.
One additional concern is that our results are influenced by drivers having personal 
favorite neighborhoods that they favor, and the drivers actively seek opportunities 
to stay within these neighborhoods, thereby creating correlation between switching 
Table 8—Switching Locations
Dependent variable Switch NTA Switch NTA Switch NTA Switch NTA
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
New  × log(drop-offs outside 0.013 0.023 0.042 0.030
  PUMA) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
New  × log(drop-offs inside 0.008 −0.004 −0.022 −0.026
  PUMA, outside NTA) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
New  × log(drop-offs inside −0.028 −0.025 −0.049 −0.034
 NTA) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Locations All Lower Excluding lower Excluding lower
Manhattan Manhattan Manhattan and
most common NTA
Date × hour × drop-off NTA
 fixed effects?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 949,315 875,130 74,075 62,090
 r 2 0.244 0.223 0.519 0.559
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the driver level, are in parentheses. “Switch NTA’’ is an indicator for 
whether the third drop-off is in a different NTA than the fourth pick-up of the shift. Column 4 excludes each driv-
er’s most common drop-off NTA, outside of lower Manhattan. The variable log(drop-offs) corresponds to the total 
number of drop-offs observed for the driver in 2009 prior to the third drop-off of the current shift. All models con-
trol for the logarithm of the current shift’s total length in hours.
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activity and experience. While we cannot address the question of driver preferences 
directly, we show that the same relationship between local experience and switch-
ing appears across different NYC locations. In specification 2, we focus on activity 
following  drop-off activity in lower Manhattan (i.e., PUMAs below Central Park’s 
northern border, where most rides terminate), while, in specification 3, we limit 
the analysis to all PUMAs except those in lower Manhattan. Finally, in specifica-
tion 4, we extend specification 3 by excluding observations from the NTA (outside 
of lower Manhattan) where a new driver has his greatest number of  drop-offs over 
the full sample period. This removes the possibility of a personal “favorite” NTA 
in which a driver prefers to focus his effort.22 Across the final three subsamples we 
find very similar effects of  NTA-level experience on switching outcomes. While the 
positive relationship between overall experience and switching persists in specifi-
cations  2-4, experience outside of an NTA but within the same PUMA is negatively 
correlated with switching behavior. The difference between specifications 1 and 2, 
which largely use the same sample, may be due to collinearity among the  drop-off 
measures, while the significantly negative coefficients on  d i,−p,t in specifications 3 
and 4 may be due to relationships among nearby NTAs outside of Manhattan, where 
 between-NTA differences in demand may be substantially different than they are 
in  higher traffic areas. We leave the issue of drivers’ full search strategies to future 
work.
IV. Discussion and Conclusions
We have described learning patterns by New York City yellow taxi drivers while 
controlling for a wide variety of potential factors that can confound empirical stud-
ies of learning by doing. In our preferred model, we find that an individual new driv-
er’s total earnings would be about $344 greater, on average, if he were able to skip 
directly to the productivity of a driver with 100 shifts of experience. The difference 
between this figure and the one we obtain ($1,016) with a simpler approach suggests 
caution in inferring learning’s value based on direct comparisons of new versus 
experienced workers’ wages. Policies to train workers may fall short of expectations 
if wage gaps are driven by selection or seniority-favoring practices.
In addition to estimating the (relatively small) impact of overall learning, we 
provide evidence on driver performance across situations that differ in difficulty 
for experienced drivers. The difference between new and experienced drivers’ per-
formance is greatest in the most difficult situations, although in these settings the 
new drivers’ performance improves relatively quickly. While other occupations are 
likely to vary in the details of where performance differences are greatest between 
new and experienced workers, our analysis suggests a novel type of heterogeneity 
to investigate when targeting training resources toward the situations where the pay-
offs are greatest. 
22 The results are unchanged if we omit the driver’s top five NTAs outside of lower Manhattan or his most fre-
quent one or two PUMAs. We focus on areas outside of lower Manhattan because when the full city is included it 
appears that all drivers’ favorite neighborhoods are near midtown. 
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Finally, we use location-specific experience measures to obtain two findings. We 
find that neighborhood-specific experience is important in improvements to driver 
productivity, and that local experience has a significant impact on drivers’ search 
strategies following drop-offs. The importance of local human capital suggests that, 
in this market, efforts to create general (i.e., market-wide) human capital could have 
very limited benefits. While a new driver’s time between passengers, a critical deter-
minant of earnings, is smaller when the driver’s history includes more drop-offs in 
the same neighborhood, this measure of driver performance is unaffected by the 
driver’s total city-wide experience. 
We present our results with two main contributions relative to the prior literature. 
First, the taxi drivers in our study are able to choose their own work strategies, and 
through fare-based compensation they are rewarded directly for strategies that are 
more successful. This is novel relative to the manufacturing settings that are com-
monly studied in the LBD literature, where workers’ actions may be relatively con-
strained by production line conventions and rigid pay practices. Second, the TLC’s 
fare-level data allow us the opportunity to examine a large number of economic 
agents moving though a precisely documented environment. The large population 
allows us to benchmark new drivers’ production relative to experienced drivers’ 
contemporaneous efforts, which is often impossible in studies that examine single 
firms or one-time production processes. The location- and time-specific data on each 
fare allow us to quantify both task difficulty and keep track of individual drivers’ 
neighborhood-specific and total experience.
Our data and analysis leave open several important questions about learning in 
general and performance by NYC taxi drivers specifically. First, we do not observe 
whether drivers selectively refuse fares to certain neighborhoods. While this is pro-
hibited by the TLC and can result in the loss of a hack license, we cannot gauge 
the frequency of this activity and its correlation with driver experience. Second, 
the absence of driver-characteristic data prevents us from describing which types 
of drivers learn most quickly, and whether learning is affected by the driver’s social 
circle or the organizational arrangements of the medallion owner. Third, our analy-
sis prevents us from characterizing fully the precise mechanisms of driver learning 
or their welfare benefits to both drivers and consumers. Finally, additional analysis 
is needed to assess how strongly our empirical arguments (on selection, etc.) and 
results apply in settings outside of the NYC taxi market.
REFERENCES
Bagger, Jesper, François Fontaine, Fabien Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Marc Robin. 2014. “Tenure, Expe-
rience, Human Capital, and Wages: A Tractable Equilibrium Search Model of Wage Dynamics.” 
American Economic review 104 (6): 1551–96.
Balasubramanian, Natarajan, and Marvin B. Lieberman. 2010. “Industry leaning environments and 
the heterogeneity of firm performance.” strategic management Journal 31 (4): 390–412.
Becker, Gary. 1964. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with special reference to 
Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchinsky, Moshe, Denis Fougère, Francis Kramarz, and Rusty Tchernis. 2010. “Interfirm Mobility, 
Wages and the Returns to Seniority and Experience in the United States.” review of Economic stud-
ies 77 (3): 972–1001.
Camerer, Colin, Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Richard Thaler. 1997. “Labor Supply of 
New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (2): 407–41.
94 AmErICAN ECoNomIC JourNAL: AppLIED ECoNomICs JANuArY 2017
Crawford, Vincent P., and Juanjuan Meng. 2011. “New York City Cab Drivers’ Labor Supply Revis-
ited: Reference-Dependent Preferences with Rational-Expectations Targets for Hours and Income.” 
American Economic review 101 (5): 1912–32.
Clement, Michael B., Lisa Koonce, and Thomas J. Lopez. 2007. “The roles of task-specific forecast-
ing experience and innate ability in understanding analyst forecasting performance.” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 44 (3): 378–98.
Doran, Kirk. 2014. “Are long-term wage elasticities of labor supply more negative than short-term 
ones?” Economic Letters 122 (2): 208–10.
Dustmann, Christian, and Costas Meghir. 2005. “Wages, Experience and Seniority.” review of Eco-
nomic studies 72 (1): 77–108.
Farber, Henry S. 2005. “Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers.” 
Journal of political Economy 113 (1): 46–82.
Farber, Henry S. 2008. “Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York 
City Taxi Drivers.” American Economic review 98 (3): 1069–82.
Farber, Henry S. 2015. “Why You Can’t Find a Taxi in the Rain and Other Labor Supply Lessons from 
Cab Drivers.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (4): 1975–2026.
Gathman, Christina, and Uta Schönberg. 2010. “How General Is Human Capital? A Task-Based 
Approach.” Journal of Labor Economics 28 (1): 1–49.
Gibbons, Robert, and Michael Waldman. 2004. “Task-Specific Human Capital.” American Economic 
review 94 (2): 203–07.
Haggag, Kareem, Brian McManus, and Giovanni Paci. 2017. “Learning by Driving: Productivity 
Improvements by New York City Taxi Drivers: Dataset.” American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150059.
Haggag, Kareem, and Giovanni Paci. 2014. “Default Tips.” American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics 6 (3): 1–19.
Hatch, Nile W., and David C. Mowery. 1998. “Process Innovation and Learning by Doing in Semicon-
ductor Manufacturing.” management science 44 (11, Pt. 1): 1461–77.
Heckman, James J., Lance J. Lochner, and Petra E. Todd. 2003. “Fifty Years of Mincer Earnings 
Regressions.” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 9732.
Hendel, Igal, and Yossi Spiegel. 2014. “Small Steps for Workers, a Giant Leap for Productivity.” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6 (1): 73–90.
Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Henry S. Schneider. 2011. “Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? 
Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry.” American Economic Journal: Applied Econom-
ics 3 (3): 244–67.
Jovanovic, Boyan, and Yaw Nyarko. 1995. “A Bayesian Learning Model Fitted to a Variety of 
Empirical Learning Curves.” Brookings papers on Economic Activity: microeconomics 1995: 
247–305.
Kellogg, Ryan. 2011. “Learning by Drilling: Interfirm Learning and Relationship Persistence in the 
Texas Oilpatch.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (4): 1961–2004.
Lafontaine, Francine, and Kathryn Shaw. 2014. “Serial Entrepreneurship: Learning by Doing?” 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 20312.
Levitt, Steven D., John A. List, and Chad Syverson. 2013. “Toward an Understanding of Learning 
by Doing: Evidence from an Automobile Assembly Plant.” Journal of political Economy 121 (4): 
643–81.
Mas, Alexandre. 2008. “Labour Unrest and the Quality of Production: Evidence from the Construction 
Equipment Resale Market.” review of Economic studies 75 (1): 229–58.
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ost, Ben. 2014. “How Do Teachers Improve? The Relative Importance of Specific and General Human 
Capital.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6 (2): 127–51.
Pisano, Gary P., Richard M. J. Bohmer, and Amy C. Edmondson. 2001. “Organizational Differences 
in Rates of Learning: Evidence from the Adoption of Minimally Invasive Cardiac Surgery.” man-
agement science 47 (6): 752–68.
Rocha, Vera, Anabela Carneiro, and Celeste Amorim Varum. 2013. “Serial Entrepreneurship, Learn-
ing by Doing, and Self-Selection.” Centro de Economia e Finanças da UP (CEF.UP) Working Paper 
2013-12.
Rockart, Scott F., and Nilanjana Dutt. 2015. “The rate and potential of capability development trajec-
tories.” strategic management Journal 36 (1): 53–75. 
Schaller, Bruce. 2006. The New York City Taxicab Fact Book. Schaller Consulting. Brooklyn, March.
Schneider, Henry S. 2010. “Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi 
Industry.” Journal of Law and Economics 53 (4): 783–805. 
VoL. 9 No. 1 95Haggag et al.: learning by Driving
Shaw, Kathryn, and Edward P. Lazear. 2008. “Tenure and Output.” Labour Economics 15 (4): 710–24.
Stith, Sarah See. 2013. “Two Essays on the Economics of Organ Transplantation.” https://deepblue.lib.
umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/100074/ssstith_1.pdf?sequence=1.
Thompson, Peter. 2001. “How Much Did the Liberty Shipbuilders Learn? New Evidence for an Old 
Case Study.” Journal of political Economy 109 (1): 103–37.
Thompson, Peter. 2010. “Learning by Doing.” In Handbook of Economics of Technical Change, Vol. 1, 
edited by Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg, 429–76. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Thompson, Peter. 2012. “The Relationship between Unit Cost and Cumulative Quantity and the Evi-
dence for Organizational Learning-by-Doing.” Journal of Economic perspectives 26 (3): 203–24. 
